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A lthough the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act (P.L. 100-360) has been repealed, the issues and debate touched off by the original passage of the act remain of policy interest. While a variety of elements led to the repeal of the legislation, this article focuses specifically on its high projected cost as a major contributing factor. We contend that, regardless of the original intent of Congress, the legislation in its final form was not catastrophic coverage but a more costly extension of basic benefits. Moreover, we show that, with respect to prescription drugs, catastrophic coverage could be provided at one-half to one-fourth of the cost of the Catastrophic Drug Insurance (CDI) program included in the 1988 catastrophic legislation.
The debate over Medicare reform that preceded passage of the act consisted of two conflicting perspectives. One held that the elderly required relief from impoverishment due to catastrophic medical expenses and that there was a need for high-end coverage. A somewhat different viewpoint was that there were existing gaps in the breadth of coverage within the basic Medicare package. Appropriate policies to resolve either of these shortcomings would affect different beneficiaries and have different cost implications. The failure to resolve these competing objectives impeded formulation of appropriate policies and development of the final legislation.
In its final form, the catastrophic legislation seemed to attempt to encompass both perspectives -it increased high-end coverage (but did so for more than those with catastrophic expenses) and included a variety of new benefits. Despite its label as a "catastrophic" coverage bill, the CDI program, as written in the 1988 legislation, would have provided reimbursement of expenses for over a third of noninstitutionalized Medicare beneficiaries in 1991. 1 It should be noted that Congress did not intend for this large a proportion of beneficiaries to be covered; the target was 16.8 percent of the beneficiary population, and efforts were under way in 1989 to bring the number of people affected in line with the projection. Nevertheless, despite the intentions of some policymakers, the bill's specific provisions and projected costs were not always congruent with its declared goals.
The notion of redirecting health insurance coverage toward catastrophic medical expenses remains appealing, although a critical issue is yet unresolved. Such coverage implicitly ranks high medical expenses for a few above a wider range of services for a larger segment of the population. Despite the importance of making the underlying trade-off between these two objectives explicit, we leave this discussion to others. priorities. Specifically, we focus on the coverage of prescribed medicines by Medicare, with an examination of the costs and distributional implications of different program parameters.
Evolution Of The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act
Some political observers have suggested that the catalyst for turning long-standing concerns about the inadequacy of health insurance coverage into a specific legislative proposal was former President Ronald Reagan's State of the Union Address in January 1986, in which he advocated catastrophic insurance. The president's language, however, reflected his administration's indecision as to the form a catastrophic bill should take. The ideas expressed in Reagan's speech were broad in scope and seemed to include both the elderly and nonelderly, as well as a broad range of services from acute to respite care. The one concept that emerged most clearly from Reagan's speech was that strategies to expand coverage should focus on the private sector.
With few details laid out by Reagan and his staff, Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) Otis R. Bowen took charge as the administration spokesperson and narrowed the broad scope of the idea into a proposal providing acute care coverage for the Medicare population. Soon members of Congress, particularly Rep. Pete Stark (D-CA) and Rep. Bill Gradison (R-OH), came forth with their own variations. Three general notions emerged from the debate. First, the commitment to catastrophic coverage was strengthened. Second, there was a consensus to limit the bill to the elderly population under the Medicare umbrella. Finally, it was clear that, given budgetary constraints and concerns about intergenerational equity, the new coverage must be self-financing. Indeed, some policymakers viewed the legislation as an opportunity to incorporate an element of income-related financing into the Medicare program.
As debates about the form of the bill continued, outside groups, particularly the elderly, pressed for inclusion of a variety of benefits. The addition of benefits such as protection against spousal impoverishment and mental health benefits went far beyond the original intent of the proposal. However, it was felt that an expansion of benefits was necessary to gain constituent support. In the spring of 1987, coverage for prescription drugs emerged as a relatively inexpensive way to satisfy the demands of the elderly for more benefits. 3 The impetus for inclusion of prescription drugs appears to have come from several studies citing the high outof-pocket cost of drugs for the elderly.
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The Catastrophic Drug Insurance Program
In its final form, the Catastrophic Drug Insurance (CDI) program would have provided coverage for outpatient drugs and insulin. Some proportion of expenses would have been reimbursed after individuals met a deductible set at $600 for 1991 and $652 in 1992, and adjusted thereafter so that 16.8 percent of Medicare beneficiaries would be eligible for reimbursement each year.
The drug benefit was seen as the part of the bill most susceptible to change. Opponents of this portion of the bill included members of the administration, who were averse to any new benefits in an era of budget reduction, and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association (PMA), who feared federal regulation of drug prices. 5 Moreover, the cost of the benefit was subject to considerable uncertainty. In estimating the benefit's cost, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was constrained by lack of timely data to use 1977 drug expenditures as the basis of their original cost estimates. There also was a vast difference between their calculation of program costs and the estimates made by Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) actuaries, due in part to lack of current data. 6 The addition of a number of unrelated benefits as well as several specific features of the drug benefit made the bill look less like catastrophic coverage. While catastrophic can be defined in a number of ways, it has been traditionally defined as spending above a predetermined dollar amount or greater than some percentage of income. With accurate data on the distribution of expenditures, the former method is identical to targeting a proportion of the population; without such data? however, the method of selecting a fixed proportion of the population as beneficiaries has no conceptual basis and, as was demonstrated with the CDI program, can be subject to considerable error. 7 Moreover, given the uncertainty surrounding the data and the fact that this was an entirely new benefit, there was no need to risk being overly generous. Congress could have started out with a more conservative target (perhaps 5 or 10 percent of the population) with the intent of later increasing it, rather than being forced to worsen benefits immediately. And, even in terms of choosing a proportion of the population, a 16.8 percent target was quite high. Elsewhere, Marc Berk and colleagues have shown, for example, that 10 percent of the population is responsible for 70 percent of overall medical expenses. 8 Finally, singling out prescription drug expenditures for coverage suggests that spending on prescribed medicines is somehow more onerous than spending on some other forms of medical care.
A more appropriate "catastrophic" bill might credit all spending on medical care toward meeting a common deductible. Although this idea does not originate with us, we believe this method would better target benefits to persons with expenses that are truly financially burdensome. Such a program might also be easier to administer. After reaching the specified level of spending, an individual's medical bills would be paid in full directly by the carrier. At this time, lack of data precludes an estimate of the costs of a plan with a unified deductible for all services; thus, we limit ourselves to prescription drugs in an effort to illustrate the contrast between the repealed catastrophic drug insurance and a more "catastrophic" alternative.
Data And Methods
Dearth of appropriate data has plagued previous attempts to model the impact of a prescription drug benefit for Medicare beneficiaries. The databases that have been used thus far have suffered from several deficiencies. Aggregate data from pharmacies that are national in scope and with which analysts can separately examine the elderly with all types of insurance coverage have been unavailable. Although some overall spending projections have been made, researchers have been unable to examine individual characteristics or develop behavioral models. In contrast, data from a household survey such as the 1987 National Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES), while useful in their ability to relate spending and sociodemographic characteristics, suffer from other problems, most notably the lack of reliability of household reports. 9 For this reason, NMES data were not used in HHS projections of the cost of the CDI program. 10 For this article, we have used data from NMES, a survey of 15,000 households (approximately 36,000 persons) that provides nationally representative estimates of medical care use, expenditures, and health insurance coverage, along with a variety of sociodemographic characteristics and health status indicators. We have adjusted the NMES person-level prescription drug expenditures to correct for underreporting by households, using correction factors developed in conjunction with the Project HOPE Prescription Drug Expenditure Verification Survey. This household survey of prescription drug use and expenditures by the elderly incorporated a pharmacy verification component. 11 We made an additional adjustment to update the data to account for price inflation in prescribed medicines, trends in the number of prescriptions per person, and the changing mix of drugs used. Average spending per noninstitutionalized enrollee was assumed to have increased at an annual rate of 11.6 percent, or 155 percent over the period from 1987 to 1991.
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One further adjustment to the data should be noted. Projections of the cost of the catastrophic coverage act all included some discussion of the likely effect of increased insurance coverage on spending, a phenomenon known as moral hazard or induced demand. Since there is little evidence about the size of the effect, particularly with respect to prescription drugs, a variety of assumptions have been employed. We chose to use a level of 5 percent for discussions of high-end coverage and 10 percent where coverage is effective at lower levels of expense.
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Catastrophic Drug Benefit Costs
Of the more than thirty-one million Medicare beneficiaries, over onethird would have exceeded the $600 deductible for outpatient prescriptions in 1991, assuming no induced demand (Exhibit 1). At this level of deductible, a beneficiary would have paid an average of almost $900, assuming a 50 percent coinsurance rate, or just over $700 with a 20 percent coinsurance rate.
14 The average government reimbursement would have been $293 and $468, respectively, per beneficiary exceeding the deductible. A range of estimates is presented because, while the legislation specified an initial coinsurance rate of 50 percent for 1991 and 40 percent for 1992, these were phase-in rates with the eventual rate intended to be 20 percent. Another possible interpretation of Congress's intent under catastrophic drug insurance is a $1,000 deductible (where 18.5 percent of Under a more truly "catastrophic" design, with the deductible set at $1,500 and no coinsurance, it is notable that the average government payment would have been only slightly higher ($535) than the program with the lower (20 percent) coinsurance rate. Although the average family payment would have roughly doubled to the catastrophic cap ($1,500), only 8 percent of Medicare beneficiaries would have exceeded this limit. Thus, both out-of-pocket and government expenses, on a per capita basis, would be higher under the catastrophic program, but substantially fewer beneficiaries would be affected.
Exhibit 2 portrays government expenditures for outpatient drugs under varying assumptions about deductibles, coinsurance, and induced demand. With a $600 deductible and assuming 10 percent induced demand, the prescription drug benefit is projected to cost from $4.1 to $6.5 billion for outpatient drugs alone, depending on whether the 50 percent or 20 percent coinsurance rate is used. The cost is somewhat less ($3.1 billion) assuming a $1,000 deductible. If the alternative catastrophic scenario proposed above-a $1,500 deductible and no coinsurance-were implemented, a different picture emerges. Total prescription drug costs would be only $1.6 billion. 15 This assumes that the effect of induced demand is somewhat smaller (5 percent) in the face of truly catastrophic expenditures.
The population that would have received drug benefits under the catastrophic legislation differs substantially from the total population of Medicare beneficiaries and from the population that would be eligible for benefits under the catastrophic alternative we have discussed (with a $1,500 deductible) (Exhibit 3). Although the three populations are relatively similar with respect to age, as one would expect, the population who would have received benefits under the legislation tends to be in Whereas only about 47 percent of all Medicare beneficiaries consider themselves to be in fair or poor health, over 65 percent of those who would have been eligible under the catastrophic law and 80 percent of those who would be eligible under the alternative program reported fair or poor health status. There are also major differences with respect to specific diagnostic conditions. Those who would receive benefits under a program with a $1,500 deductible are more than twice as likely as the general Medicare population to have suffered from a stroke, a heart attack, hardening of the arteries, heart disease, or diabetes; there are also large and significant differences in the probability of having gall bladder disease, high blood pressure, rheumatism, and emphysema. Many of the beneficiaries under the catastrophic alternative program would receive relatively modest benefits; about two-thirds of those who would exceed the $1,500 deductible would incur total expenses of less than $2,000. About 27 percent would have expenses of between $2,000 and $2,500, while 8 percent (or about 207,000 beneficiaries) would incur over $2,500 in total prescription drug expenditures. The overall cost of such a program is kept relatively low, not only by providing more limited benefits but also by clearly targeting those beneficiaries with very high use levels.
To highlight the range of plans that might be considered catastrophic coverage, Exhibit 4 presents a comparison of three alternative drug benefit plans, two of which are variants of the catastrophic drug insurance program and the third, a high-end coverage plan. The first plan assumes a $600 deductible, 20 percent coinsurance, and 10 percent induced demand; the second, a $1,000 deductible; and the third, a $1,500 deductible, no coinsurance, and 5 percent induced demand. Under provisions similar to those in the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act, 12.5 million beneficiaries would receive benefits with an average value of $522. The average benefit is calculated as 80 percent of the sum of prescription drug expenses exceeding $600. An intermediate program would affect almost seven million beneficiaries with an average benefit of $503. Under the alternative program with a $1,500 deductible and no copayment, 2.9 million persons would receive benefits averaging $567.
The drug provision of the catastrophic coverage act would have been financed by both an increase in the Medicare Part B premium and an additional income-related premium, levied on the wealthiest 40 percent of Medicare beneficiaries. The income tax surcharge with a cap of $800 was the most controversial component of the legislation, ultimately contributing to its repeal. If the entire drug benefit, excluding administrative costs, were financed through an increase in the Medicare Part B premium, it would require a monthly premium of $17 (assuming a 20 percent coinsurance rate) or $9.10 (assuming a 50 percent coinsurance rate). In contrast, the alternative program would require a monthly premium of $4.36.
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Conclusions
The Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act was in many respects a misnomer, offering coverage for medical events not normally considered catastrophic. This basic benefit extension, not coverage of catastrophic expenses, led to the legislation's high projected cost. The rancorous nature of the catastrophic debate led to a distorted perception among both policymakers and beneficiaries about the cost of catastrophic coverage. Such coverage is relatively inexpensive and can be financed in a number of ways that do not require an income tax surcharge for the elderly. An alternative catastrophic drug bill with a high deductible but no coinsurance could be implemented at one-half to one-fourth the cost of the repealed catastrophic drug benefit.
Even if we conclude, however, that extending catastrophic coverage should be a major new health policy priority, the rationale behind the mix of benefits offered under this particular legislation is not logically apparent. Had the act been implemented fully, Medicare beneficiaries would have been subject to three separate deductibles: one for hospitalization, one for physician visits, and one for prescription drugs. 17 Three hypothetical scenarios illustrate that beneficiaries incurring identical levels of health care costs could be subject to widely different out-of-pocket expenses under catastrophic legislation. Under the first, a patient incurs $6,000 of charges, all related to hospitalization, while in the second, a patient incurs $3,000 of inpatient costs, $1,500 in physician charges, and $1,500 in expenses associated with prescription drugs, In the third, a patient incurs $600 in hospital costs, $2,700 in physician charges, and the remaining $2,700 in payments for prescription drugs. While all three persons had total health costs of $6,000, the first patient would incur out-of-pocket expenses of $560, compared to $1,700 for the second patient and $2,180 for the third patient. The rationale behind such widely divergent benefits is unclear.
If new initiatives are developed to address the problem of catastrophic coverage, we suggest that all types of health care services in both Medicare Part A and Part B, as well as any newly covered services, be considered together under a single deductible. We have illustrated that, in the case of prescription drug expenditures, adding $900 to the deductible would permit the program to be implemented at one-fourth the cost. Data from NMES are not yet available to permit a similar analysis for other medical services, but we believe the results of such an analysis are likely to yield similar results. The implementation of the single, relatively large deductible that covers all services would permit the extension of Medicare coverage to include prescription drug expenditures; indeed, if the deductible were large enough, some coverage of long-term care might also be possible.
Although we believe the creation of a more "back-loaded" catastrophic drug benefit would offer significant advantages over the provisions of the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act, we would have serious reservations about the implementation of either program. First, there is no compelling evidence that expanding health insurance coverage to the catastrophically ill should become our number-one policy priority. The highest-spending 1 percent of the U.S. population accounts for approximately 30 percent of total health care expenditures, while the top 2 percent accounts for just under 40 percent; there is evidence that increased health insurance coverage for catastrophic illness could skew these distributions even further. 18 Moreover, the complex bioethical issues raised by Daniel Callahan need to be carefully debated by policy makers before an even larger portion of government health care dollars is allocated to the very ill. 19 The debate over the relative advantages of firstdollar versus catastrophic coverage has long been of interest to health economists. 20 While such debate goes beyond the scope of this analysis, explicit recognition of these trade-offs will enhance future development of Medicare initiatives.
